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Abstract. A large body of literature agrees that persons with schizophrenia suffer from a Theory of Mind 
(ToM) deficit. However, most empirical studies have focused on third-person, egocentric ToM, 
underestimating other facets of this complex cognitive skill. Aim of this research is to examine the ToM 
of schizophrenic persons considering its various aspects (first vs. second order, first vs. third person, 
egocentric vs. allocentric, beliefs vs. desires vs. positive emotions vs. negative emotions and how each of 
these mental state types may be dealt with), to determine whether some components are more impaired 
than others. We developed a Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.) and administered it to 22 
persons with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia and a matching control group. Th.o.m.a.s. is a semi-
structured interview which allows a multi-component measurement of ToM. Both groups were also 
administered a few existing ToM tasks and the schizophrenic subjects were administered the Positive and 
Negative Symptoms Scale and the WAIS-R. The schizophrenic persons performed worse than control at 
all the ToM measurements; however, these deficits appeared to be differently distributed among different 
components of ToM. Our conclusion is that ToM deficits are not unitary in schizophrenia, which also 
testifies to the importance of a complete and articulated investigation of ToM. 
 
Keywords: schizophrenia, theory of mind, mindreading, assessment, first person, third person, 
allocentric perspective, egocentric perspective, clinical interview. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Theory of Mind (ToM) was initially defined by Premack and Woodruff (1978) as the ability to 
ascribe mental states to oneself and the others and to use this knowledge to predict and explain 
the relevant actions and behaviors. Frith (1992, 1994) advanced the hypothesis that underlying 
the complex symptomatology of schizophrenia may be a deficit of ToM. In Frith's account, the 
symptoms of schizophrenia — whether positive, like delirium and hallucinations. or negative, 
like apathy and anhedonia — are consequences of, or reactions to, a breakdown of the ability to 
handle the mental states of one's own and of the others. 
A large body of empirical evidence appears to support Frith's hypothesis: schizophrenic 
subjects perform worse than normal at several types of ToM tasks (Doody, Götz, Johnstone, 
Frith & Cunningham Owens, 1998; Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995; Frith & Corcoran, 1996; 
Mazza, De Risio, Surian, Roncone & Casacchia, 2001; Pickup & Frith, 2001; Mazza, De Risio, 
Tozzini, Roncone & Casacchia, 2003). Langdon (2003) classified the mentalizing tasks to 
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which persons with schizophrenia tend to perform poorly into six types, according to whether 
they require comprehending false belief and deception stories (Doody, Götz, Johnstone, Frith & 
Cunningham Owens, 1998; Drury, Robinson & Birchwood, 1998), appreciating visual jokes 
(Corcoran, Cahill & Frith, 1997), inferring the intentions of characters in comic strips (Sarfati, 
Hardy-Baylé, Besche & Widlöcher, 1997; Sarfati & Hardy-Baylé, 1999), inferring complex 
mental states from facial expressions (Kington, Jones, Watt, Hopkin & Williams, 2000; Brüne, 
2005a), sequencing picture card stories that require inferring false beliefs (Langdon, Michie, 
Ward, McConaghy, Catts & Coltheart, 1997; Langdon, Coltheart, Ward & Catts, 2001; 
Langdon, Coltheart, Ward & Catts 2002; Brüne, 2003), and comprehending non-literal speech 
acts (Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995; Drury, Robinson & Birchwood, 1998; Mitchley, Barber, 
Gray, Brooks & Livingstone, 1998; Langdon, Coltheart, Ward & Catts, 2002). To such list can 
be added the recognition of mental states from close-up photographs of a person's eyes, a task 
originally created by Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb (2001) to which 
schizophrenic subjects perform as poorly (Irani, Platek, Panyavin, Calkins, Kohler, Siegel, 
Schachter, Gur & Gur, 2006). 
The impairment of social cognition in schizophrenia appears to be unrelated to IQ or to the 
performance at non-social cognitive tasks (Penn, Corrigan, Bentall, Racenstein & Newman, 
1997). Therefore, it is better viewed as a specific facet of the symptomatology of the disease 
than as a consequence of a general cognitive damage (Brüne 2005b). 
However, the precise nature of the ToM deficit in schizophrenia is still unclear. While the 
patients with negative symptoms and those with thought disorder tend to perform poorly at ToM 
tasks, other results appear equivocal. For example, patients with paranoid delusions do ascribe 
intentions to others, the problem being that they often ascribe the wrong ones (Blakemore, 
Sarfati, Bazin & Decety, 2003; Frith, 2004), which lets one think that the problem with their 
ToM is more a malfunction than an actual breakdown. 
Also interestingly, these deficits are not homogeneous: different results may be obtained 
when different components or sub-skills of ToM are investigated in persons with schizophrenia. 
Mazza et al. (2001), for example, found the performance of these subjects at first-order ToM 
tests (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) to be better than that at second-order ones (Perner & Wimmer, 
1985). The difference between the two types of task is that success in the former requires to 
understand a character's belief about a state of the world, while success in the latter requires to 
ascribe nested mental states, that is to understand a character's belief about the beliefs of another 
character, which turns out to be more difficult. 
The distinction between first- and second-order ToM reasoning is not the only important 
one. Recent theoretical studies argued that ToM has a complex nature that cannot be reduced to 
an on-off or an all-or-nothing functioning (Tirassa, Bosco & Colle, 2006a) and pointed to the 
possibility of decomposing it into different aspects or components. Nichols and Stich (2002) 
argued that understanding the first and the third persons are different activities that are mediated 
by different processes and recruit knowledge of different types. 
Because most tests of ToM focus on the third person, the functioning of the first person in 
schizophrenia is substantially less known. However, a study by Gambini, Barbieri and Scarone 
(2004) supports the idea that the abilities to mentalize in the first and in the third person should 
be kept distinct. These authors found that, during interviews concerning their delusions, some 
schizophrenic subjects can gain insight into their own mental states when the perspective is 
shifted from the first to the third person. A different kind of evidence was provided by an fMRI 
study conducted by Vogeley, Bussfeld, Newen, Herrmann, Happé, Falkai, Maier, Shah, Fink & 
Zilles (2001), who found different patterns of brain activation in different lobes as healthy 
subjects took the first- or the third-person perspective. 
Another distinction, orthogonal to that between first- and third-person ToM, is that between 
egocentrism and allocentrism (Frith & de Vignemont, 2005). In the egocentric perspective, the 
others are represented in relation to the self, while in the allocentric perspective the others' 
mental states are represented independently from the self. Again, however, there is no empirical 
test of this distinction. 
To sum up, there is a wide agreement in the literature that ToM is more complex than a 
monolithic, all-or-nothing function that just turns on and off whenever necessary and functions 
as whole. Yet, to date there is no single test for its assessment which be able to yield, within a 
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unitary framework, specific and comparable measures along the first- vs. second-order, the first- 
vs. third-person, and the egocentrism vs. allocentrism dimensions. 
For this reason we developed a new instrument, the Theory of Mind Assessment Scale 
(Th.o.m.a.s.: Bosco, Colle, Pecorara & Tirassa, 2006), which adopts a unitary methodology to 
investigate different ToM abilities, thus providing more complete, detailed, and comparable 
profiles of this elusive function. We administered Th.o.m.a.s. to a group of schizophrenic 
subjects; we expected their ToM abilities to be damaged, but we also wished to investigate in 
detail whether specific components or sub-skills were less impaired than another. 
In the next section we will describe the ToM Assessment Scale and the hypotheses it allowed 
to generate; then, we will report the empirical data obtained from its administration to a group 
of 22 persons suffering from schizophrenia and a matching control group. 
 
 
 
2. The Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.) 
 
Th.o.m.a.s. is a semi-structured interview aimed at assessing a subject's theory of the mind. It 
consists of thirty-nine open-ended questions that leave the interviewee free to express and 
articulate her thought. When they are not provided spontaneously by the interviewee, the 
interviewer may specifically ask for real-world examples to enrich and contextualize the 
answer. 
Differently from most other instruments for the study of mentalization, where a subject's 
ToM is appraised based on her performance at predefined tasks, Th.o.m.a.s. is a direct inquiry, 
where the subject is invited to express her understanding of mental states, both of her own and 
of the others. Beside what has been discussed in the previous section, another major reason why 
Th.o.m.a.s. has such structure is the standpoint that we adopt in the ongoing theoretical 
discussion concerning the very nature and "functioning" of ToM. In brief, the problem is 
whether ToM consists of an explicit, formal, substantially linguistic form of reasoning or also 
(or only) of other, less theorematic and less local activities (Gallagher, 2001; Zahavi, 2005; 
Gallagher & Hutto, 2008). 
There is no space to discuss the issue here, nor is it the focus of this paper (but see Tirassa, 
Bosco & Colle, 2006b; Tirassa & Bosco, 2008). We have little doubt that, as humans, we can 
engage in highly complex ToM reasoning when we need or want to, as it happens when a 
general attempts to foresee and understand what his opponent's strategies will be on the 
battlefield; yet, there can be as little doubt that we do not explicitly represent and reason about 
the mental states of anybody who happens to smile and say hello to us or to be drinking a 
double whiskey in the bar where we are eating a sandwich. In the latter cases, we are not 
making any theory about the other's mental states (or even about those of our own), and we may 
hardly ever notice that there is a social activity going on in which we are immersed. Yet, our 
mental activities are not devoid of a social, mentalizing flavor — our observations of or actions 
toward these individuals are fully informed by our comprehension that the former is treating us 
gently, and that the latter is a thirsty customer of the bar. This is why we are ready to smile and 
shake hands with the one, or to understand why the other is beginning to mutter about having 
lost a job and a spouse. 
Th.o.m.a.s. builds on the idea that the human mentalizing abilities are basically a way to look 
at the world, a background which informs our whole social life and against which more explicit, 
theory-driven reasoning episodes become possible and meaningful. We felt that an interview 
would be more appropriate to let such worldview emerge, without focusing too much on the 
more formal, theorematic activities that may or may not be employed moment by moment by an 
individual, particularly one with a mental problem. 
The interview is originally in Italian. The questions of which it is composed (see Appendix 
1) are organized along four scales, each focusing on one of the knowledge domains in which a 
person's ToM may manifest itself. 
 
• Scale A, I–Me. It investigates the interviewee's knowledge of her own mental states. The 
viewpoint of the questions is centered on the interviewee (I) reflecting on her own mental states 
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(Me), (e.g., "Do you ever experience emotions that make you feel good?"). This scale 
investigates first-person ToM in an egocentric perspective. 
 
• Scale B, Other–Self. It investigates the knowledge that, according to the interviewee, the 
other persons have of their own mental states, independently of the subject's perspective. The 
viewpoint of the questions is centered on the other persons (Other) reflecting on their own 
mental states (Self), (e.g., "Do the others try to fulfill their wishes?"). This scale investigates 
third-person ToM in an allocentric perspective. 
 
• Scale C, I–Other. It investigates the interviewee's knowledge of the mental states of other 
persons. The viewpoint of the questions is centered on the interviewee (I) reflecting on the 
others' mental states (Other), (e.g., "Do you notice it when the others feel good?"). This scale is 
similar to scale B in that they both investigate third-person ToM; however, while the 
perspective there is centered on the other, here it is centered on the interviewee. In other words, 
here the subject is asked to take an egocentric perspective. 
 
• Scale D, Other–Me. It investigates the knowledge that, from the interviewee's point of view, 
the others have of her mental states. The viewpoint of the questions is centered on the other 
persons (Other) reflecting on the mental states of the interviewee (Me), (e.g., "Do the others 
notice it when you feel good?"). This scale can be compared with a 2nd-order ToM task, in that 
the abstract form of the questions is: "What do you think that the others think that you think?". 
 
Each scale is divided into three subscales that respectively explore the dimensions of 
Awareness, Relation and Realization of mental states: 
 
• Awareness. It investigates the interviewee's ability to perceive and differentiate beliefs, 
desires and emotions in herself and in the others. Recognizing different types of mental states is 
a necessary precondition of understanding their links and causal relations with one another and 
with the external world. 
 
• Relation. It investigates the interviewee's ability to recognize causal relations between 
different mental states and between them and the resulting behaviors. For example: "When you 
feel bad, do you feel you understand why?". Being capable to connect and to integrate different 
mental states and to understand their reciprocal relations and bi-directional connections with 
perceptions and actions is necessary to draw up an explanatory theory of the mind and of the 
social world. 
 
• Realization. It investigates the interviewee's ability to adopt effective strategies to achieve a 
desired state. For example: "Do you succeed in getting what you want? How?". To act 
adaptively requires not only to have a theory of the causal relations between mental states and 
between the mental states and the world, but also to know how to use this knowledge to 
appropriately and successfully affect the mental states and the behavior of one's own and of the 
others. 
 
Based on current theorizing on the most important types of mental states that an agent's 
cognitive architecture has to comprise (Tirassa, 1999; Tirassa & Bosco, 2008), the questions 
focus on the interviewee's perspectives on epistemic states (knowledge, beliefs and so on), 
volitional states (desires, intentions and so on) and positive and negative emotions. 
In a graphic representation of the structure of the interview (see Appendix 2), the four scales 
and their subscales are the columns of a table whose rows represent the types of mental states 
investigated. Thus, each cell of the table represents a specific intersection of two of the 
dimensions that the interview considers. Each question in its turn refers to a specific cell of the 
table, that is it encourages the interviewee to express her understanding of the relevant aspect of 
the activities of the mind. 
For example, question [1]: "Do you happen to experience emotions that make you feel 
good?" explores the ability to identify one's own positive emotions (dimensions investigated: 
Awareness and Positive emotions). Question [7]: "Do you happen to have wishes, and know 
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what you want?" encourages the interviewee to express her awareness of her own desires 
(dimensions investigated: Awareness and Desires). Analogous considerations can be made for 
each question. This structure is replicated for all four scales. Wherever appropriate, the 
interviewee is asked to provide one or more episodic examples. 
In line with the current literature, we expected the schizophrenic subjects to show an 
impaired ToM when compared with control. However, we expected some aspects of their ToM 
to be better preserved than others. In particular, their score at scale A (I–Me), which assesses 
first-person ToM, may significantly differ from that at scale B (Other–Self), which evaluates 
third-person ToM. 
We also investigated possible differences in the subjects' performance at scales B (Other–
Self) and C (I–Other): both investigate third-person ToM, but the former takes an allocentric 
perspective and the latter an egocentric one. 
Finally, we investigated possible differences between scales A, B, and C, which investigate 
first-order ToM, and scale D, which investigates 2nd-order ToM. 
 
 
 
3. Method 
 
3.1 Participants 
 
Twenty-two persons with a diagnosis of schizophrenia according to the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) 
helped us to collect the present data. All participants were outpatients of the San Gerardo 
Hospital of Monza (Psychosocial Center of Besana Brianza). All participants were native 
speakers of Italian. None was acutely or florid psychotic: all were tested in their chronic phase. 
The DSM-IV subtypes were so distributed: paranoid (11 subjects), undifferentiated (4 subjects), 
disorganized (3 subjects), residual (4 subjects). The subjects were receiving medication: 9 
received typical medicine (haloperidol and methotrimeprazine, a.k.a. levomepromazine), 11 
atypical (clozapine, quetiapine, risperidone and olanzapine), 2 both typical and atypical. The 
mean of illness onset was 25.86 years (standard deviation — s.d. = 6.18) and the mean duration 
of illness was 13.73 (s.d. = 6.47). 
Inclusion criterion for schizophrenic subjects was IQ > 70, evaluated with the WAIS-R1; 
their mean IQ was 90 ± 15. 
The symptomatology of the schizophrenic subjects at the time of testing was investigated 
with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS: Kay et al., 1987). It consists of thirty 
items subdivided into 3 scales: one for positive symptoms (7 items), one for negative symptoms 
(7 items) and a general psychopathology scale (16 items); each item is assessed on a 7-points 
scale ranging from "absent" (1) to "extremely serious" (7). The subjects' mean scores were: 
Negative symptoms 25.86 (s.d. = 6.18), Positive symptoms 7.5 (s.d. = 4.65), General symptoms 
45.00 (s.d. = 12.47). 
A control group of healthy persons was also included in the study. The two groups were 
matched for sex (schizophrenic subjects: 12 females, 10 males; controls: 12 females, 10 males), 
age (schizophrenic subjects: mean = 39.59 ± 9.51; controls: mean 38.5 ± 9.8), and years of 
formal education (schizophrenic subjects: mean = 10.4 ± 3.35; controls: mean 10.18 ± 3.06). 
Exclusion criteria for both schizophrenic subjects and controls included an anamnesis of 
neurological or neuropsychological disease, leucotomy, head injury, and substance or alcohol 
abuse (both defined as per DSM-IV). 
 
3.2 Materials and procedures 
 
In addition to Th.o.m.a.s., the following ToM tests were administered in vivo to both the 
schizophrenic subjects and the controls. 
 
Sally and Ann (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). The experimenter, holding a doll named 
Sally and one named Ann, says: "Sally places her ball in the basket and leaves the scene. Ann 
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moves the ball from the basket to the box". While speaking, the experimenter acts out the 
corresponding gestures and then asks the subject: "When Sally comes back, where will she think 
her ball is?" 
 
Smarties modified (Cigarettes). This is a modified version (Pickup & Frith, 2001) of the original 
Smarties task (Perner et al., 1987). The experimenter shows the subject a cigarette pack and 
asks: "What is inside this?". Of course the subject answers: "Cigarettes". The experimenter then 
opens the pack, shows that it contains pencils instead, closes it again and asks: "When the nurse 
enters, what will she think is inside?" 
 
Strange Stories (Happé, Brownell & Winner, 1999). We presented a selection of six Strange 
Stories, excluding those that require the comprehension of communicative acts like metaphors 
and irony. An example is the following story: "A burglar who has just robbed a shop is making 
his getaway. As he is running home, a policeman on his beat sees him drop his glove. He doesn't 
know the man is a burglar, he just wants to tell him he dropped his glove. But when the 
policeman shouts out to the burglar, 'Hey, you! Stop', the burglar turns round, sees the 
policeman and gives himself up. He puts his hands up and admits that he did the break-in at the 
local shop." The subject is asked: "Why did the burglar do that?" A correct interpretation of the 
situation requires to assess the burglar's mental state and to realize that he misunderstood the 
policeman's intention, which was to give back the glove. 
 
With the authorization of the interviewees, all Th.o.m.a.s. interviews (subjects and controls) 
were tape-recorded and then transcribed.2 The transcriptions were rated by two independent 
judges, who had not participated to the interviewing phase and were blind to whether each 
person whose answers they were coding belonged to the experimental or the control group. 
Each judge was asked to assign each answer a score from 0 to 4, according to the given 
rating criteria (see Appendix 3), and to insert it in the relevant cell of the correction grid (see 
Appendix 2). 
The two judges reached a significant level of inter-reliability on their first judgments of the 
schizophrenic subjects' and the control subjects' answers, considered separately, both 
considering the total Th.o.m.a.s. scores (Correlation Coefficient: correlation ranging from .83 to 
.86, p < .001) and each subscale (Correlation Coefficient: correlation ranging from .81 to .91, p 
< .001). For the final score assignment they discussed each item upon which they disagreed 
until a full agreement was reached. 
The two judges also scored the other ToM tests, following the relevant criteria available in 
the literature, assigning 0 to each incorrect answer and 1 to each correct one. 
 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Between-groups differences 
 
Figure 1 shows the mean scores for the schizophrenic subjects and the controls to each 
Th.o.m.a.s. scale. We performed an ANOVA with two levels on between factors (subject group: 
subjects vs. controls) and four levels on within factors (scale type: A, I–Me; B, Other–Self; C, 
Me–Other; D, Other–Me). As expected, there was a significant main effect of subject group 
(F1,38 = 5.09, p < .001) and a main effect of scale type (F3,114 = 8.55, p < .001). Figure 1 reveals 
that the subjects performed worse than the controls at all scale types. The interaction between 
subjects and scale type was not significant. 
Figure 2 shows the mean scores for the schizophrenic subjects and the controls to each 
Th.o.m.a.s. subscale. We performed an ANOVA with two levels on between factors (subject 
group: subjects vs. controls) and three levels on within subjects factors (subscale type: 
Awareness, Relation, Realization). Again as expected, there was a significant main effect of 
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subject group (F1,38 = 34.90, p < .001) and a main effect of subscale type (F2,76 = 5.71, p = 
.0049). Figure 2 reveals that the subjects performed worse that the controls at all subscale types. 
The interaction between subject and subscale type was significant too (F2,76 = 5.72, p = .015). 
Figure 3 shows the mean scores for the schizophrenic subjects and the controls to each 
Th.o.m.a.s. dimension. We performed an ANOVA with two levels on between factors (subject 
group: subjects vs. controls) and four levels on within subjects factors (dimension type: Desires, 
Beliefs, Positive emotions, Negative emotions). Again as expected, there was a significant main 
effect of subject group (F1,38 = 36.17, p < .001) and a main effect of dimension type (F3,114 = 
5.37, p = .0017). Figure 3 reveals that the subjects performed worse than controls at all 
dimension types. The interaction between subjects and dimension type was not significant. 
Finally, the overall performance at the conventional ToM tasks was 69% of correct answers 
for the subjects and 95% for the controls; as expected, this difference was significant (T test: t = 
3.75, p = .0012). 
 
4.2 Schizophrenic subjects' performance at Th.o.m.a.s. 
 
Focusing on the schizophrenics' performance at Th.o.m.a.s., we conducted a within subjects 
ANOVA with four levels on within subjects factors (scale type: A, I–Me; B, Other–Self; C, 
Me–Other; D, Other–Me). We found significant differences between the schizophrenics' mean 
scores at the four individual scales (F3,57 = 5.95, p = .001, see Figure 1). In particular, as 
expected, post hoc pairwise comparison (Bonferroni corrected: p ranging from p = .027 to p = 
.028) revealed that the subjects scored higher at scale A (I–Me), which assesses first-person 
ToM, than at all the other three scales: B (Other–Self) and C (Me–Other), both of which assess 
third- person ToM, and D (Other–Me), which assesses ToM with a second-level inference. No 
significant differences existed between the latter three scales. 
We also conducted a within subjects ANOVA with three levels on within subjects factors 
(subscale type: Awareness, Relation, Realization) that revealed a significant difference between 
the schizophrenics' total mean performance at the three subscales (F2,38 = 6.64, p = .003) (see 
Figure 2). In particular, post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the subjects scored higher 
at the Awareness subscale than at the Relation subscale (Bonferroni corrected: p < .001), while 
there was no significant difference between the others. 
For explorative purposes, we investigated whether differences existed between the 
schizophrenic subjects' total mean performance at the four dimensions (Beliefs, Desires, 
Positive emotions, Negative emotions) but found none (within subjects ANOVA: F3,57 = 2.72, p 
= .053) (see figure 3). 
 
4.3 Correlations within the schizophrenics' group 
 
We investigated the correlations between the schizophrenics subjects' scores at Th.o.m.a.s. and 
at the conventional ToM tests, finding that there existed both with the Th.o.m.a.s. total score 
(Correlation = .54, p = .013,) and with scales A, B, and C (Correlation: ranging from .045 to 
.065, p ranging from .0013 to .033). No correlation was instead found with scale D (Correlation 
= .41, p = .073) (see Table 1). 
We also found a correlation between the schizophrenic subjects' IQ and their mean scores 
both at Th.o.m.a.s. total (Correlation = 57, p = .0072) and at scales B, C and D (Correlation 
ranging from .48 to .70, p ranging from .02 to .0004), while none was found with scale A 
(Correlation = .27, p = .23). 
We ruled out a correlation between the schizophrenic subjects' years of education and their 
mean scores at either Th.o.m.a.s. total and at scales A, B, and C (Correlation ranging from .22 to 
40, p ranging from .07 to .32), with the exception of scale D (Correlation .53, p = .014). 
Finally, we correlated the PANSS score and the Th.o.m.a.s. score: significant correlations 
are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
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The Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.) is meant to provide a more articulated and 
thorough investigation of ToM than those available in the literature. It provides specific and 
comparable measures of ToM within a unitary framework, taking into account the distinctions 
between first and second order, between the first and the third person, between the egocentric 
and the allocentric perspective, and between different types of mental states and how each of 
them may be dealt with. In addition, it provides a direct inquiry of how the interviewee views 
her capability to understand and deal with her own mental states and those of the others. 
In line with Frith's (1992) hypotheses, we found an impaired ToM to be associated with 
schizophrenia. The global Th.o.m.a.s. score of the schizophrenic subjects we examined was 
worse than control, as was their performance at each of the four scales (A, B, C and D), at each 
of the three subscales (Awareness, Relation, and Realization), and at each of the four types of 
mental state assessed (Beliefs, Desires, Positive emotions, and Negative emotions). Globally, 
our results are aligned with the literature, showing a ToM deficit in schizophrenia (for 
overviews see Casacchia, Mazza & Roncone, 2004, and Harrington, Siegert & McClure, 2005). 
However, in line with our hypothesis, we found that schizophrenic subjects show a 
variegated performance to questions that, albeit conceived and formulated in similar ways and 
within a unitary framework, involve different aspects of ToM: some ToM abilities, however 
impaired with respect to controls, turned out to be better preserved than others: on the average, 
schizophrenic subjects scored higher at scale A, which assesses first-person ToM, than at scales 
B and C, which assess third-person ToM. They scored equally at the latter two, which means 
that their performance did not differ whether the questions concerning third-person ToM took 
an allocentric (scale B) or an egocentric (scale C) perspective. This supports the ideas that first-
person ToM is better preserved in schizophrenia than third-person ToM and that there are no 
significant differences in this respect between egocentric and allocentric perspective. 
Whether humans are better at reasoning in the first or in the third person is a current matter 
of hot debate. Our results support Goldman's hypothesis (1993) that they can better reason about 
their own mental states than about those of the others. 
Other researchers, however, argue in favor of the opposite view (e.g., Gopnik, 1993). On 
interviewing schizophrenics about their delusions, Gambini et al. (2004) found that they 
performed better at the third person than at the first. The relevant questions were "Do you really 
think that what you just told me is real? Do you have any doubt about it?" or "If you were me, 
would you consider reasonable what you just told me? If someone else told you what you just 
told me, would you believe them?" However, the better performance at the latter questions than 
at the former could be explained by the subjects' experience that doctors, family members and, 
in general, the other persons do not consider their delusions plausible or reasonable, rather than 
by a truly better capability of reasoning about the others' mind. 
Further research thus appears to be needed regarding first- vs. third-person ToM. 
Finally, the schizophrenic subjects performed at scale D worse than at scale A: this is not 
surprising, because the latter requires a first-order inference while the former requires a second-
order one. 
As regards the three Th.o.m.a.s. subscales (Awareness, Relation, and Realization), the 
schizophrenic subjects' mean performance at the Awareness subscale is significantly higher than 
that at the Relation subscale. This suggests that, at least limitedly to our experimental paradigm, 
their ability to be aware of and reflect upon mental states is impaired — as shown by the 
comparison with the control group —, but less than their ability to understand the causal links 
that mental states have with each other and with behavior. Reasonably, relation and realization 
appear to be more complex than the mere recognition of inner states. No significant difference 
emerged from the other comparisons between the subscales or from the comparison between the 
four mental states types explored (Beliefs, Desires, Positive emotions, and Negative emotions). 
A significant correlation existed between standard ToM tests (Sally and Ann, Cigarettes, and 
Strange Stories) and both the overall Th.o.m.a.s. score and scales A, B and C. This correlation 
does not exist with scale D (Other–Me): this is not surprising because D assesses second-order 
ToM, which is not specifically investigated by any of the conventional ToM test we used. 
The schizophrenic subjects' IQ had a significant correlation both with the total Th.o.m.a.s. 
scores and with scales B (Other–Self), C (I–Other), and D (Other–Me), but not A (I-Me), 
probably because the latter is the easiest. 
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The relation between ToM and IQ in schizophrenia has been investigated in the literature, 
but not with univocal results. Doody et al. (1998) found that the schizophrenics' deficit in 
second-order ToM did not correlate with their IQ, while Pickup and Frith (2001) found a ToM 
impairment only in a second-order task and it was associated with low IQ. Brüne (2003) found a 
correlation between the verbal IQ of schizophrenic subjects and their performance at ToM tasks; 
the correlation still existed when the IQ of the subjects and of the controls was matched. 
Generalizing from the literature, ToM performance appears to be affected, but not completely 
explained, by IQ (Mitchley, Barber, Gray, Brooks & Livingstone, 1998; Garety & Freeman, 
1999; Greig, Bryson & Bell, 2004). 
In this regard, we also found that the education level of the schizophrenic subjects did not 
correlate with their global Th.o.m.a.s. score or with the scores at the individual scales, with the 
exception of scale D (Other–Me). Our instrument thus appears to reliably measure ToM 
capabilities and not education or intelligence. The correlation with scale D is probably due to 
the greater difficulty of the latter, which requires a second-order perspective and might therefore 
require intellectual skills beside ToM. 
We then investigated the correlation between the subjects' scores at PANSS and at 
Th.o.m.a.s. The PANSS general psychopathology score correlated with the mean Th.o.m.a.s. 
total score and with each individual scale, with the exception of scale D. The PANSS scale of 
negative symptoms correlated negatively with both the total Th.o.m.a.s. score and each 
individual scale, while the scale of positive symptoms correlated significantly with the 
Th.o.m.a.s. total score and with scales A and C, but not B and D. 
These results are in line with those of Lysaker, Carcione, Dimaggio, Johannesen, Nicolò, 
Procacci & Semerari (2005), who applied the Metacognition Assessment Scale — originally 
developed for the evaluation of mentalization during psychotherapy (Semerari, Carcione, 
Dimaggio, Falcone, Nicolò, Procacci & Alleva, 2003) — to the narratives of schizophrenic 
persons, finding that depressed mood, a general symptom, correlated with their ability to 
understand their own mind (first person). Emotional withdrawal, a negative symptom, correlated 
with their ability to understand both their own mind and that of the others, while hallucinations, 
a positive symptom, correlated with their ability to understand their own mind but not with their 
ability to understand that of the others. Our results concerning the correlation with the negative 
symptoms are also in line with Langdon, Michie, Ward, McConaghy, Catts & Coltheart (1997) 
and Langdon, Coltheart, Ward & Catts (2001), who argued that the patients with prevailing 
negative symptoms are those whose ToM is impaired most severely. 
On the whole, these results support the idea that positive and negative symptoms relate 
differently to different facets of ToM impairment. 
A limitation of our study lies in the fact that we could not distinguish different sub-types of 
schizophrenic subjects so to explore whether their performances at Th.o.m.a.s. differ. Yet, 
according to the current literature different symptoms may relate to different ToM 
performances. In the same vein, it might be interesting to define the specific performance of 
each sub-type of schizophrenia at the various Th.o.m.a.s. subscales and components. 
Furthermore, studies in literature showed that schizophrenia is associated with deficits in 
communicative (Hoffman & Grove, 1985; Frith & Allen, 1988), mnestic and executive 
functioning abilities (Stirling, 1997; Bryson, Whelahan & Bell, 2001; Silver, Feldman, Bilker & 
Gur, 2003; Oram, Geffen, Geffen, Kavanagh & McGrath, 2005). Further work could benefit 
from a more fine-grained assessment of these abilities, so to correlate a poor ToM performance 
with their possible impairment (see for example Lysaker et al., 2005). 
Overall, and given the complexity of the disorder investigated, we view this research as 
initial. Further, more in-depth examination is needed. However initial, though, our results show 
that ToM impairments may and do come in different types and degrees according to the domain 
considered: first vs. third person, first vs. second order, egocentric vs. allocentric, Awareness vs. 
Relation and Realization, etc. This appears to encourage this research direction to promote a 
more thorough understanding of this crucial and complex faculty and of its impairments. 
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Appendix 1. The interview 
 
This appendix contains the complete interview, divided into subscales. The numbers in parentheses 
indicate the position of each question in the evaluation grid (Appendix 2). For the sake of this 
presentation, the questions have been reordered following the theoretical order in which they are 
discussed in the article; the actual order of presentation was: 1 - 1a - 2- 31 - 31a - 32 - 11 - 11a - 12 - 21 - 
21a - 22 - 3 - 3a - 4 - 5 - 6 - 6a - 33 - 33a - 35 - 35a - 34 - 37 - 38 - 13 - 13a - 14 - 14a - 15 - 15a - 16 - 
16a - 23 - 23a - 24 - 26 - 27 - 28 - 36 - 7 - 7a - 8 - 8a - 9 - 10 - 39 - 29 - 17 - 17a - 18 - 19 - 20. 
 
Th.o.m.a.s. being a semi-structured interview means that the interviewee's replies may sometimes 
anticipate some questions that would have the subject of a specific question at a later point. Analogously, 
explanations and examples may or may not be spontaneously offered by the interviewee. Therefore, a 
certain redundancy exists in the interview as it is presented here; this serves to remind the interviewer to 
ask for all the information needed, unless it has been spontaneously provided by the interviewee. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
We are examining the idea of mind that each of us has. This study is being conducted on behalf of the 
University. 
 
To this purpose we have devised a series of questions aimed at understanding what is generally meant by 
"mind". These questions cannot evaluate the interviewee's intelligence or personality. There are no 
correct or incorrect answers to them: each reply simply reflects each person's position in relation to the 
topic. 
 
The questions are not meant to be inquisitive: when you are asked to give examples based on your 
personal experience, this is only done to help us understand exactly what you mean. You may refuse to 
answer any question if you so wish, and we shall end this interview at any moment if you become 
unwilling to continue. 
 
We ask that you either reply sincerely or not at all: we prefer you to leave a blank space than to give an 
insincere reply. 
 
Finally, please do not hesitate to ask any explanations you may require about the meaning of the 
questions. You may take as much time as you need to answer the questions. 
 
If you wish to ask me any question now, I will be pleased to answer it. Otherwise, we can start as soon as 
you are ready. 
 
 
Scale A (I-Me) 
 
[1] Do you happen to experience emotions that make you feel good? 
What? On what occasions? Can you give an example? 
 
[1a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why not? 
 
[2] When you feel good, does that make any difference to you? 
What are the differences? 
Can you give an example of how you act or think, or of things that happen to you when you feel good? 
 
[3] Do you happen to experience emotions that make you feel bad? 
What? On what occasions? Can you give an example? 
 
[3a] (If the answer is negative) Have you ever asked yourself why? 
 
[4] When you feel bad, does that make any difference to you? 
What are the differences? 
Can you give an example of how you act or think, or of things that happen to you when you feel bad? 
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[5] When you feel bad, do you feel you understand why? 
Can you give an example? 
[6] Can you change your mood, when you want to? 
How? On what occasions? Can you give me an example? 
 
[6a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why can't you? 
 
[7] Do you happen to have wishes, and know what you want? 
What? On what occasions? Can you give an example? 
 
[7a] (If the answer is negative) 
Do you ever ask yourself why? 
 
[8] Do you try to fulfill your wishes? 
How? On what occasions? Can you give an example? 
 
[8a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why don't you try? 
 
[9] Do you succeed in getting what you want? 
How? On what occasions? Can you give an example? 
 
[10] Can you explain why you succeed/do not succeed? 
 
 
Scale B (Other-Self) 
 
[11] Do the other persons happen to experience emotions that make them feel good? 
What? On what occasions? Can you give an example? 
 
[11a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why not, in your opinion? 
 
[12] When the others feel good, does that make any difference to them? 
What differences does it make? 
Can you give an example of how they act or think, or of things happening to them when they feel good? 
 
[13] And do the other persons happen to experience emotions that make them feel bad? 
What? On what occasions? Can you give an example? 
 
[13a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why not, in your opinion? 
 
[14] When the others feel bad, does that make any difference to them? 
What differences does it make? 
Can you give an example of how they act or think, or of things happening to them when they feel bad? 
 
[15] In your opinion, when the others feel bad, do they understand why? 
Can you give an example? 
 
[15a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why don't they understand, in your opinion? 
 
[16] And, in your opinion, can the others change their mood when they want to? 
How? On what occasions? Can you give an example? 
 
[16a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why not, in your opinion? 
 
[17] Do the others happen to have desires and know what they want? 
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What sorts of desires do they have? Can you give an example? 
 
[17a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why not, in your opinion? 
[18] Do the others try to fulfill their desires? 
How? On what occasions? Can you give an example? 
 
[18a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why don't they try, in your opinion? 
 
[19] In your opinion, do the others succeed in getting what they want? 
How? On what occasions? Can you give an example? 
 
[20] Why do/don't they manage, in your opinion? 
 
 
Scale C (I-Other) 
 
[21] Do you notice when the others feel good? 
When does that happen? Can you give an example? 
 
[21a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why don't you notice? 
 
[22] When you notice that another person feels good, does that make any difference to you? 
What differences does it make? 
Can you give an example, of how you act or think, or of the things that happen to you? 
 
[23] Do you notice when the others feel bad? 
When do you notice that? Can you give an example? 
 
[23a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why don't you notice? 
 
[24] When you notice that another person feels bad, does that make any difference to you? 
What differences does it make? 
Can you give an example of how you act or think, or of the things that happen to you? 
 
[25] When the others feel bad, do you understand why? 
Can you give an example? 
 
[25a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why can't you explain why other people feel bad? 
 
[26] Do you ever want to influence the mood of the others? 
How? On what occasions? Can you give an example? 
 
[27] Do you succeed in doing so? 
How? On what occasions? Can you give an example? 
 
[28] How do you explain the fact that you manage/do not manage to do so? 
 
[29] Do you think you understand the others' wishes? 
What sort of wishes do they have? Can you give an example? 
 
 
Scale D (Other-Me) 
 
[31] Do the others notice when you feel good? 
When do they notice? Can you give an example? 
 
[31a] (If the answer is negative) 
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Why don't they notice? 
 
[32] When the others notice that you feel good, does that make any difference to them? 
What differences does it make? Can you give an example of how they act or think when they notice that 
you feel good? 
[33] Do the others notice when you feel bad? 
When do they notice? Can you give an example? 
 
[33a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why don't they notice? 
 
[34] When the others notice that you feel bad, does that make any difference to them? 
What differences does it make? 
Can you give an example of how they act or think when they notice that you feel bad? 
 
[35] When you feel bad, do the others understand why? 
Can you give an example? 
 
[35a] (If the answer is negative) 
Why don't they understand? 
 
[37] Can the others influence your mood? 
How? On what occasions? Can you give an example? 
 
[38] How do you explain that they succeed/do not succeed in doing so? 
 
[39] Do you think that the others understand your desires? 
In your opinion, what sort of wishes do they think you have? Can you give an example? 
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Appendix 2. Interview data coding grid 
 
This appendix contains the grid for the coding and the insertion of the replies. Each question prompts the 
interviewee to supply a personal opinion regarding a specific aspect of how her mind or the mind of the 
others works. For example, question [3]: " Do you happen to experience emotions that make you feel 
bad?" investigates the interviewee' ability to identify her own positive emotions (Scale A: I-Me; subscale: 
Awareness; dimension: Positive emotion). 
 
The scores for each question are inserted in the corresponding cell, to provide both qualitative and 
quantitative data for the various domains of theory of mind. 
 
 
Scale 
 
A (I–Me) 
 
B (Other–Self) 
 
Subscale 
 
Awareness 
 
Relation 
 
Realization
 
Awareness 
 
Relation 
 
Realization 
 
Beliefs 
 
 
 
 
5 10  15 (15a) 20 
Desires 
 
 
7 (7a) 
 
8 (8a) 9 17 (17a) 18 (18a) 19 
Positive 
emotions 
 
1 (1a) 
 
2 6 (6a) 11 (11a) 12 16 (16a) 
Negative 
emotions 
 
3 (3a) 
 
4 13 (13a) 14 
Totals 
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Scale 
 
C (I–Other) 
 
D (Other–Me) 
 
Subscale 
 
Awareness 
 
Relation 
 
Realization
 
Awareness 
 
Relation 
 
Realization 
 
Beliefs 
 
 
 
 
25 (25a) 28  35 (35a) 38 
Desires 
 
 
29 
 
26  39   
Positive 
emotions 
 
21 (21a) 
 
22 27 31 (31a) 32 37 
Negative 
emotions 
 
23 (23a) 
 
24 33 (33a) 34 
Totals 
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Appendix 3. Rating criteria 
 
This appendix contains the criteria used for scoring the replies. 
 
The interview is recorded (with the interviewee's permission) and transcribed; the replies are rated on the 
transcript. 
 
Each judge assigns each reply a score ranging from 0 to 4 and inserts it in the relevant cell; each cell thus 
corresponds to a reply given by the interviewee and represents the specific intersection between two of 
the dimensions investigated. 
 
The sample replies reported below are taken from actual interviews of the subjects who participated in 
the study (I = interviewer; H = healthy control; S = schizophrenics). 
 
 
Score = 0 
 
A score of 0 is attributed: 
- when the interviewee remains silent, however encouraged by the interviewer; 
- when the reply is incomprehensibly confused, or completely irrelevant to the question, or detached from 
reality, as in the following example: 
 
(I) And do the other persons experience emotions that make them feel good? Positive emotions… Do the 
others, like your friends or the members of your family experience positive emotions? 
(Schizophrenic) …No. 
(I) Don't the others experience positive emotions? 
(S) No 
(I) Why, according to you, don't they? 
(S) Perhaps, they don't have them, they have no morals, they are immoral, I don't know. 
(I) Therefore, since they are immoral, they don't experience them? 
(S) These are facts. 
(I) And therefore they do not have positive emotions. 
(S) No, I don't think they do. 
 
 
Score = 1 
 
A score of 1 is attributed: 
- when the interviewee gains time without in fact providing any meaningful reply; 
- when the interviewee says that she does not know how to reply or limits herself to replying yes or no 
without adding anything else, however encouraged by the interviewer; 
- when the reply is confused or inconsistent with regard to the question; 
- when an example is provided (spontaneously or after a request by the interviewer) which does not 
appear consistent with the reply itself, as in the following example: 
 
(I) And when people feel good, does something change in them? 
(S) No, something changes in the fact that I am there for them, let's say that they can rely on me. 
(I) Can you give an example? 
(S) It happened with this teacher. 
 
 
Score = 2 
 
A score of 2 is assigned to a reply which: 
- is confused, albeit relevant to the question; 
- is a mere repetition of the question without any further consideration or explanation (e.g., a tautological 
reply); 
- expresses an emotional tone which is inconsistent with the question (e.g. an emotionally positive reply 
to a question concerning negative emotions); 
- is not correctly aligned with the perspective required by the question, e.g. when the question concerns 
another person's emotional states (allocentric perspective) and the reply only refers to the interviewee 
himself or herself (egocentric perspective). For example: 
 21
 
(I) When you feel good, do other people notice this? 
(S) To repeat, when I feel good, that is to say, I, my character… I have always tried to have a character, 
so as not to reveal my moods, because when I had those… those few moments I tried… to stay alone for 
a moment and then afterwards… 
(I) On the other hand, when you feel good, do they then notice that? 
(S) No, but they usually never see when I don't feel well because, I repeat, when I don't feel well, I tend 
to isolate myself, to be on my own… 
(I) So what you say is that the others always see you, however, when you feel good, that is only when 
you feel good, because when you don't feel good, you disappear… 
(S) But, to repeat, I'm not such a melodramatic person, yes, I have those moments, I get mad and I say S. 
(says his own name) you've got to react, there exists a problem, let's try to solve it… 
(I) Therefore, the example is, precisely, your daily life, let's say… 
(S) Yes 
(I) OK. 
 
 
Score = 3 
 
A score of 3 is assigned to a reply which: 
- is not articulated; 
- is articulated and coherent, but provided with difficulty or only after several attempts on the part of the 
interviewer; 
- is consistent with the question but has no concrete, meaningful example; 
- provides an example which is approximate, generic, meaningless, or only refers to behaviors instead of 
mental states or events; 
- is coherent and consistent, but generic, stereotyped or only slightly contextualized. For example: 
 
(I) When you feel good, does something change in you, in your way of acting or thinking? 
(H) Yes, I act more willingly, more calmly. 
(I) What do you mean, more willingly? 
(H) In the sense that I do something, both concerning the field of work or the… normal field. 
(I) OK. Fine. Do you remember an occasion on which you felt good and, as a result, you felt more 
inclined to do something, more willing? 
(H) Yes, more willing. A particular occasion… no, not at this moment… 
(I) For example, that time when you dated this girl… what changed in you? 
(H) Well, the change was that I felt rather… how can I say… rather… agitated, then I felt happy, I 
took… more willingly, wow, in my way of acting, doing… 
 
 
Score = 4 
 
A score of 4 is attributed to a reply which: 
- is coherent, detailed and organized, with significant, coherent and contextualized examples; 
- refers in different ways to the interviewee's own mental states and events and to those of the others, thus 
providing not a generic or prototypical reply, but a contextualized one which bears a relation to the 
interviewee's personal experience. For example: 
 
(I) Do you experience emotions that make you feel good? 
(H) Well, certainly, emotions are the most important things you can experience in your life, therefore 
there are emotions that can be linked to feelings, to what you see, therefore if you go to a beautiful place 
that yields emotions in you… for example, last winter I went to Brazil, I spent New Year's Eve in Brazil 
and I experienced wonderful emotions concerning how the people are, how I fitted in, like an emotion of 
feeling love for someone or finding, let's say of falling in love with another person, that is to say there are 
many moments in which one feels emotions. 
 
To obtain a score of 4, it is not necessary for the interviewee to provide an example based on her personal 
experience: it is sufficient that the reply is contextualized in a well detailed manner, that there are 
differentiations; thus, an invented example may suffice if it is meaningful and well contextualized. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schizophrenics vs. controls: mean total scores at Th.o.m.a.s. and mean scores at the individual 
scales (range: 0–4) with standard error bars. 
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Figure 2. Schizophrenics vs. controls: mean total scores at Th.o.m.a.s. and at the individual subscales 
(range: 0–4) with standard error bars. 
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Figure 3. Schizophrenics vs. controls: mean total scores at Th.o.m.a.s. and at the four dimensions (range: 
0–4) with standard error bars. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1. Schizophrenic patients: Correlations between Th.o.m.a.s. and IQ, PANSS, ToM tasks 
(Correlation Coefficient) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PANSS: 
 
Negative symptoms 
 
Positive symptoms 
 
General symptoms 
 
QI 
 
Years of education 
 
ToM tasks (Total) 
 
Th.o.m.a.s. scales 
 
 
 
A 
I–Me 
1st person 
egocentric 
 
 
B 
Other–Self 
3rd person 
allocentric 
 
C 
Me–Other 
3rd person 
allocentric 
 
D 
Other–Me 
3rd person 
allocentric 
 
Totals 
4 scales 
 
Corr. 
 
 
p 
 
Corr. 
 
p 
 
Corr. 
 
p 
 
Corr. 
 
p 
 
Corr 
 
p 
 
.86 
 
-.47 
 
-.50 
 
.26 
 
.22 
 
.52 
 
<.0001 
 
.02 
 
.016 
 
n.s. 
 
n.s. 
 
.013 
 
-84 
 
-13 
 
-43 
 
.48 
 
.26 
 
.45 
 
<.001 
 
n.s. 
 
.04 
 
.02 
 
n.s. 
 
.033 
 
-.85 
 
-.48 
 
-.63 
 
.59 
 
.39 
 
.65 
 
<.001 
 
.02 
 
.002 
 
.005 
 
n.s. 
 
.0013 
 
-.65. 
 
-.28 
 
-.45 
 
.69 
 
.54 
 
.41 
 
.001 
 
n.s. 
 
n.s 
 
.0004 
 
.01 
 
n.s. 
 
-.87 
 
-.45 
 
-.62 
 
.57 
 
.40 
 
.54 
 
<.001 
 
.047 
 
.003 
 
.007 
 
n.s. 
 
.013 
 
 
